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Female Audit Committee Members and Their Influence on Audit 
Fees 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
We test the relationship between female representation on the audit committee and audit fees 
for 624 Australian companies in the year 2011. A positive relationship is found, leading to the 
conclusion that female presence on audit committees influences the quality of the external 
audit.  Further, we find that gender is the significant audit committee characteristic in predicting 
audit quality, and that women on the audit committee strengthen the positive relationship 
between firm size and audit fees, and between risk and audit fees. Conversely, we find that 
female representation dampens the positive relationship between complexity and audit fees.  
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1. Introduction 
The structure and effectiveness of the board of directors and its subcommittees is 
perhaps one of the most recognized forms of corporate governance (Connelly, Hoskisson, 
Tihanyi, and Certo, 2010; De Lacy, 2005). In particular, the audit committee, viewed by many 
as the most important board subcommittee (Kesner, 1988; Klein, 1998; Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt, 2003), has wide-ranging authority over the financial accountability and reporting 
process. It appoints, compensates, and oversees the work and independence of the external 
auditor. Furthermore, the audit committee reviews the general purpose financial reports, 
provides oversight of the internal control and risk management processes and pre-approves all 
auditing and non-auditing services (Aldamen, 2010; Australian Institute of Company Directors, 
2011; Klein, 1998). Certain characteristics, such as independence, expertise and accounting 
education are critical to the audit committee’s effectiveness (Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004; 
Klein, 2002; Krishnan, 2005). However, more recently, gender diversity on boards and 
committees has gained recognition as one of the factors that increases effectiveness. Female 
directors on boards can have influence over the level of risk aversion, conservatism when 
making decisions, and the monitoring of management (Gul, Hutchinson and Lai, 2013; 
Thiruvadi and Huang, 2011). In fact, participation of female directors in subcommittees, such 
as the audit committee, is not merely a gender equality issue, per se, but a governance issue 
that requires thorough consideration.  
Prior literature provides evidence to support the relationship between female representation on 
boards of directors and firm-specific variables such as value (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 
2003), stock returns (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2010), earnings management (Arun, 
Almahrog, and Aribi, 2015), earnings quality (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui, 2011), financial 
restatements (Abbott, Parker, and Presley, 2012), and continuous disclosure compliance 
(Chapple and Truong, 2015). Female directors exercise better monitoring of management 
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(Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and the likelihood of corporate failure is reduced when female 
directors sit on boards (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002). Firms with female CEOs report more 
conservative earnings (Ho, Li, Tam, and Zhang, 2015) and are more conservative in estimating 
discretionary accruals (Barua, Davidson, Rama, and Thiruvadi, 2010; Peni and Vähämaa, 
2010). 
The relationship between firm performance and board gender diversity has also been 
studied extensively over the years and while positive relationships have been found (for 
example, Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader, 2003; Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow, 2015), results 
have certainly been mixed. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that females have better patterns 
of attendance at board meetings than males and that gender-diverse boards exercise more effort 
in their monitoring activities, however, they find that women directors have a negative impact 
on firm performance. In Denmark where female board representation is very low, gender 
diversity has no impact on firm performance (Rose, 2007). Using U.S. data, Carter et al. (2010) 
also find no evidence to link board gender diversity with financial performance, and Chapple 
and Humphrey (2014) arrive at a similar result examining board gender diversity in their 
Australian study. These inconsistent findings leave the question of whether gender diversity at 
the board level improves organizational performance undecided and, despite a large body of 
literature, no definitive conclusions have been reached.  
However, a recent meta-analysis of 140 studies between 1997 and May 2014, covering 
144 independent samples, and representing over 90,000 firms in 35 countries was conducted 
by Post and Byron (2015).  They sought confirmation that female board members positively 
affect firm performance. They found a positive relationship between accounting returns and 
female board representation, and further, that this relationship was greater in countries with 
stronger stakeholder protection mechanisms. Their findings about the relationship between 
female board members and market performance, while slight, were positive in countries where 
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greater gender parity exists but negative in countries with low gender parity. Consequently, it 
seems appropriate to conclude that female board members do enhance company financial 
performance but not necessarily company stock market performance.   
However, little is known about the impact of gender diversity on the audit committee 
and proxies of external audit outcomes such as audit fees. Prior studies focus on how female 
directors influence the effectiveness of the audit committee (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, and 
Simpson, 2010; Sun, Liu, and Lan, 2011; Thiruvadi and Huang, 2011). They also examine the 
relationship between various aspects of corporate governance and audit fees (Bliss, 2011; Boo 
and Sharma, 2008; Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, and Riley, 2002; Chan, Liu, and Sun 2013; 
Griffin, Lont, and Sun, 2008; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). However, a specific link between 
female representation on the audit committee and audit fees is largely unexplored. To date, two 
studies have been identified in which this relationship is directly investigated. Ittonen, 
Miettinen, and Vähämaa (2010) examine the relationship between audit committee gender 
diversity and audit fees in S&P 500 firms. They find that committees with more than one female 
member or with a single female member serving as chair report lower audit fees. These findings 
are attributed to increased internal monitoring and improved communication on the part of 
female members, which lowers perceived audit risk and reduces the need for external audit 
services. In a conference paper, Sultana and Rahman (2016) followed a line of enquiry similar 
to ours.  They found that audit committees with female representation have higher audit fees 
and higher abnormal audit fees.   
We propose a positive relationship between gender diversity on the audit committee 
and audit fees. Consistent with the demand-side perspective (Abbott, Parker, Peters, and 
Raghunandan, 2003; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007), we contend 
that effective committees will require more services from the external auditor. We base our 
premise on the notion that female audit committee members will seek higher quality audit 
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information, which in turn will require more audit services, thereby increasing audit fees. 
Furthermore, we propose that female directors on the audit committee moderate the 
relationships between audit fees and inherent situational factors such firm size, risk and audit 
complexity. Thus, we expect that when these situational factors are low, the presence of female 
directors on the audit committee creates a supply-side effect whereby audit fees decrease due 
to a reduction of audit risk. However, when the inherent situational factors are high, the 
presence of females on the audit committee will not reduce audit risk adequately and demand-
side effects will result in increased fees. 
The importance of this topic stretches beyond bridging the gap in the literature to 
include the consideration of the rising trend in world markets where gender diversity on boards 
of directors is encouraged and in some instances, expected. Some countries (e.g., Australia, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom) recommend gender diversity as part of corporate governance 
best practices (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010; Financial Reporting Council, 2014; 
Ontario Securities Commission, 2013). However, other countries (e.g., Belgium, France, India, 
Italy, Norway and Spain) have enacted a quota system whereby it is mandatory to maintain a 
certain number of female directors on the board (Kamonjoh, 2014). Given this increased 
attention, it is imperative to understand the corporate governance implication of gender 
diversity on boards of directors and their subcommittees. This study not only contributes to the 
extant literature by examining the thinly researched topic of the relationship between female 
representation on the audit committee and audit fees, it also offers world markets empirical 
evidence that will influence the debate on the importance of gender diversity.  
We test the relationship between female representation on the audit committee and audit 
fees for 624 non-financial Australian companies in the year 2011. This year is significant in 
the Australian context due to the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council (2010) recommendation that corporate boards should establish measurable objectives 
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to become more diverse in terms of gender and to report on the proportion of women employees 
in the company. It is expected that after 2010 companies subject to these recommendations will 
make an effort to increase female participation on their boards and audit committees. Thus, our 
study examines this issue at a critical turning-point in the composition of audit committees.  
Using OLS regression, we confirm our first proposition by demonstrating a positive 
relationship between the presence of females on the audit committee and the fees charged by 
the auditor. This finding provides support for the demand-side argument that female 
representation on audit committees results in a committee that requires more services from the 
external auditor, resulting in higher audit fees. Additionally, we use interaction terms to 
examine our second proposition regarding the moderating role of female audit committee 
members on the relationship between the three situational characteristics (firm size, firm risk, 
and audit complexity) and audit fees. We find that in the presence of low size and low risk, 
there is support for the supply-side argument in that fees are lower when there are females on 
the audit committee. In the presence of high size and high risk, we find support for the demand-
side argument in that fees are higher when women serve on the audit committee. However, in 
examining audit complexity, we find the opposite. Female representation dampens the positive 
relationship between complexity and audit fees, resulting in higher fees for low complexity 
audits and lower fees in high complexity audits when women are on the committee.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section Two provides a review of prior 
literature, presents a theoretical link between female representation on the audit committee and 
audit fees, and states our hypotheses. Section Three details the research design. Section Four 
describes the results of the analysis. Finally, Section Five offers a discussion of the results and 
the conclusion to the paper in which contributions and limitations of our study are described.  
2. Literature Review, Theoretical Foundation, and Hypotheses 
The board of directors and subcommittees such as audit committees are chief mechanisms 
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that play an important monitoring role on behalf of shareholders. From an agency theory 
perspective, corporate governance mechanisms provide independent substantive oversight of 
management’s activities, which should protect shareholder interests. Including female board 
members on the audit committee not only adds diversity, but strengthens the monitoring efforts of 
the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). However, institutional theory provides a different view to 
female representation on boards and subcommittees. According to the theory, firms’ concern for 
their perceived legitimacy prompts their adoption of various policies and procedures that conform 
to other organizations’ actions (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal, 2009; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Dunn 
(2012) proposes that rather than focusing on operational improvements, firms that emulate others’ 
practices do so for reasons of survival. They wish to avoid their activities being challenged, and 
thus create a perception of lower uncertainty and risk, and consequently gain greater access to key 
resources (Dunn, 2012). Others contend that mimicking behavior is mostly for ceremonial purposes 
and some research has questioned whether the very existence of audit committees is largely for 
ceremonial purposes rather than for effective monitoring of financial reporting (Beasley et al., 
2009; Cohen et al., 2008). Whatever the reason, the incidence of females on corporate boards and 
subcommittees continues its upward trend as companies follow the lead of others and conform to 
regulatory requirements in increasing gender diversity in corporate governance. 
Long before corporate governance principles and recommendations were established, 
researchers asserted that the scope or extent of an external audit is directly influenced by the 
audit committee (Carcello et al., 2002; Collier and Gregory, 1996; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 
2006; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). This is a credible notion as the audit committee possesses 
and exercises powers with regard to supporting and promoting audit quality and in determining 
the scope and adequacy of the external audit. Audit committees also have rights to obtain 
information from internal and external auditors and to make recommendations to the board on 
issues that include the appointment or dismissal of external auditors (Australian Institute of 
8 
 
Company Directors, 2011). Thus, the audit committee holds a position of power and influence 
over the quality of audit demanded from the external auditor. Further, the general belief is that 
effective audit committees influence the level of audit coverage and thus audit fees. Given the 
authority assigned to an audit committee in performing its oversight role of the financial 
reports, this is reasonable and is supported by research evidence (Abbott et al., 2003; Beasley 
et al., 2009; Carcello et al., 2002; Hay, Knechel, and Ling, 2008; Turley and Zaman, 2007).  
The study of gender diversity of audit committees in relation to external audit fees is 
relatively new and only two studies have been identified that address this topic. In one study, 
Ittonen et al. (2010) find that external audit fees are lower when there are women on the audit 
committee and suggest this is due to women enhancing the monitoring activities of the audit 
committee. However, this is inconsistent with the findings of Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui (2008) 
which explores female board members’ impact on audit effort. Gul et al. (2008) found that 
audit fees are higher with female board membership and suggest that female membership 
influences higher demand for audit effort. The Sultana and Rahman (2016) conference paper 
also found higher audit fees in the presence of female audit committee members but did not 
explicitly link this to female audit committee members demanding more audit effort.  
2.1 Characteristics of Female Board Members 
Archival researchers do not generally have access to private information regarding 
board decision-making and this makes the dynamics of mixed gender representation in the 
boardroom difficult to observe and measure. As a result, research has often focused on 
identifying differences between the characteristics of board members of each gender. A 
plethora of literature in the psychology and business disciplines examines differences in 
attitudes, characteristics, and decision-making across gender. These studies show that women 
possess certain qualities that differ from, or are of different levels than, those possessed by men 
and find this works to the company’s benefit in various ways. For example, women’s 
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communication capabilities are more effective (Wood, Polek, and Aiken, 1985) and female 
directors are more inclined to ask questions that men would not ask (Konrad, Kramer and Erkut, 
2008). Board oversight is improved with female participation (Srinidhi et al., 2011; Thomas 
and Ely, 1996). This increases board independence which in turn has a positive influence on 
firm value (Carter et al., 2003).  
Females working as a group may provide better solutions to a problem (Wood et al., 
1985).  Wood et al. (1985) conducted a psychology experiment and found that while all male 
groups generated more solutions to a problem, higher quality solutions were generated by 
female groups.  A positive influence on firm performance is evident when the board consists 
of a higher percentage of women rather than a single female director (Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera, 2008). Konrad et al. (2008) determined that two women on a board are better than one 
because they have a larger impact on the board than a single woman and that three women (the 
“magic number”) are better than two. They suggest that, from a group dynamics perspective, a 
critical mass of three or more females might have a noticeable bearing on boardroom content 
and dynamics.  Furthermore, they found that more varieties of topics are discussed when three 
or more women are on the board and that this helps the board to focus on longer-term 
sustainable performance.  Joecks, Pull and Vettner’s (2013) research of German firms found 
that it takes a critical mass of three female directors before higher firm performance is achieved.  
It is noted, however that Germany has a dualistic corporate governance system and different 
results might be observed in different corporate governance systems.   
Female board presence disrupts groupthink and promotes a slower pace of decision-
making (Abbott et al., 2012; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Robinson and Dechant, 1997). 
Females have a higher quality decision-making capability and are more likely to challenge the 
conventional decision making processes because they feel significantly less constrained by the 
use of rules, regulations and other traditional ways that dominate the typical normative 
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reasoning of male decision-making (Bart and McQueen, 2013).  Women also are more likely 
to engage in participative decision-making (Mano-Negrin and Sheaffer, 2004). Further, female 
directors are said to be better directors as they are significantly more likely to consider the 
interests of multiple stakeholders and consistently make fairer decisions when competing 
interests are at stake (Bart and McQueen, 2013). These practices promote better corporate 
governance. 
Numerous studies have also found that women have a lower preference for risk (e.g., 
Barber and Odean 2001; Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List, 2002;  
Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie, 2004; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Johnson and Powell, 
1994; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Thiruvadi and Huang, 2011; Watson and McNaughton 2007), 
and make more conservative decisions than men (Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer, 1999; Levin, 
Schneider, and Gaeth, 1988; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Schubert, 2006; Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007). Conservatism in risk preferences is likely to lower the potential for 
bankruptcy.  Furthermore, Lord Davies’ 2011 report on women board members (Davies, 2011), 
referred to a study by a Leeds University Business School that found that having one female 
director reduced the chances of bankruptcy by 20% and this was reduced even further if there 
were two or three females on the board. 
It is not surprising that, given the qualities women are likely to bring to the corporate 
boardroom and their contributions to corporate governance, they are taking part in important 
subcommittees such as the audit committee.  However, despite the important role of this 
committee and calls for greater diversity in audit committee composition, research in this area 
is fairly limited. Thiruvadi (2012) finds that gender diverse audit committees are more likely 
to display diligence by meeting more often. Attributes associated with women such as a 
questioning nature, communication skills, commitment to duty, and fair and morally consistent 
decision making are essential to effective corporate governance and are likely to increase the 
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effectiveness of an audit committee in implementing board policy and governance. Virtanen’s 
(2012) finding that female board members take more active roles on the board supports the 
supposition that females bring the same qualities to their subcommittee positions and influence 
the extent of internal and external monitoring demanded by the audit committee. Given that 
women are also more conscientious (Schmitt, Realo, Voracek and Allik, 2008), and take their 
responsibilities more seriously (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000), it is plausible that they would also 
demand more detailed and extensive audits. Consistent with the increased audit fees found to 
be correlated with female board membership (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui, 2008) and female audit 
engagement partners (Ittonen and Peni, 2012), it is reasonable to assume that female 
representation on the audit committee may also lead to increased audit fees. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Given the traits demonstrated by women in corporate governance positions, it seems 
plausible that female presence on the audit committee would increase its effectiveness. This is 
in line with a Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) study, which suggests a positive link between female 
presence on the audit committee and audit quality. Female attributes of diligence, 
independence, conservatism, and risk-aversion demonstrated in previous studies suggest that 
women audit committee members would demand a higher level of audit quality and require 
more detailed work by the external auditor. This increased audit effort would result in higher 
audit fees than those for companies with all male audit committees.  
We posit that in a gender diverse audit committee, a higher quality audit will be 
demanded increasing the level and scope of services required of external auditors and 
manifesting in higher audit fees. Consistent with the preponderance of the results of studies of 
audit committee effectiveness, we hypothesize the following: 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between female presence on the audit committee and 
audit fees.  
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Previous literature postulates two approaches to explain the effect of audit committee 
effectiveness on audit fees: the demand-side and the supply-side arguments. Demand-side 
arguments contend that more effective audit committees command more external audit effort, 
driving up audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2008; Zaman, Hudaib, and Haniffa, 
2011).  On the other hand, supply-side arguments (Abbott et al., 2003; Munro and Stewart, 
2011; Stewart and Munro, 2007) posit that effective audit committees better monitor the 
financial reporting process and communicate better with the auditors, thereby reducing audit 
risk. High-risk audits result in higher fees by requiring more audit procedures. When effective 
audit committees reduce the audit risk, the extent of audit work from the auditor’s perspective 
is reduced, thus lowering audit fees (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). 
Studies investigating the impact of audit committee effectiveness on audit fees take one 
approach or the other, treating the supply-side and demand-side arguments as competing 
theories and findings exist to support each. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) acknowledge that 
these are complementary rather than competing theories yet they do not approach them as such. 
We posit that the conflicting findings in the past are a result of not considering the interplay of 
these two approaches and we propose a unified model of the impact of audit committee 
effectiveness on audit quality that incorporates both approaches (see Figure 1). 
<Figure 1 about here> 
Consistent with the demand-side argument, the model proposes a positive relationship 
between audit committee effectiveness and audit effort, which in turn is positively related to 
audit fees. In addition, the model incorporates the supply-side argument by proposing a 
negative relationship between audit committee effectiveness and audit risk. Audit risk has a 
direct, positive relationship with audit fees due to risk premiums (Jiang and Son, 2015) and 
auditor experience (Cahan and Sun, 2015) necessary in risky audits. Risk also impacts audit 
fees indirectly via a positive relationship with audit effort since risky audits require more effort. 
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Thus, we contend audit fees are driven by both audit effort and degree of audit risk. 
Furthermore, each of these is influenced by the effectiveness of the committee. 
While an effective committee may reduce the control risk component of audit risk, the 
inherent risk component is unaffected and remains. Inherent risk is a result of situational factors 
such as firm size and firm risk, as well as audit complexity, which are specific to the 
organization and its business environment. The inherent risk for each organization is different 
and in some situations, an effective committee may mitigate the risk sufficiently to effect lower 
audit fees even in the face of increased audit effort. However, in other situations, the risk may 
be so great that even a high degree of audit committee effectiveness may not counteract the 
necessity for extensive and expensive audit procedures.  
Several conditions contribute to the level of inherent risk, and subsequently the external 
audit work required. The seminal study by Simunic (1980) shows that firm size and risk, as 
well as audit complexity are primary factors that explain audit fees. Later studies by Francis 
and Simon (1987) and Simon and Francis (1988) further support the importance of those 
factors. The underlying argument is that as firm size increases so does the number of 
transactions that need to be audited. Furthermore, companies that are risky stand to undergo 
bankruptcy, which might subject the auditor to reputational damage or litigation. This will 
encourage the audit firm to conduct more thorough investigations to protect themselves from 
this possibility. A similar argument is also made for firms that maintain complex operations. 
Those firms will most likely require extensive reporting and record keeping. As a result, the 
auditor will need to allocate additional time and resources to examine those records (Ittonen et 
al., 2010; Loukil, 2014). In each of these cases, we propose that inherent risk will be high, 
increasing overall audit risk. 
We propose that in a mixed gender audit committee, a higher quality audit will be 
demanded in these high-risk situations increasing the level and the scope of services required 
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of external auditors and will manifest in higher audit fees (demand-side argument). 
Simultaneously, greater monitoring of managerial behavior will occur when females are 
present on the audit committee; this will reduce control risk (supply-side argument). However, 
we contend that the reduction in control risk will not be sufficient to mitigate the increase in 
audit risk created by the higher inherent risk. Thus, we expect that when inherent risk is high, 
fees will be higher when there are females on the audit committee than for all-male audit 
committees.  
On the other hand, while we expect committees with female members to demand more 
audit effort than all-male committees, when inherent risk factors are low we expect audit 
committees with females to request fewer procedures than they do in high risk situations. In 
addition, female presence on the committee will effect increased monitoring and better 
communication with the auditors, resulting in decreased control risk. The combination of 
decreased control risk with already low inherent risk will result in audit risk low enough to 
mitigate the demand for additional procedures. Thus, we expect that when inherent risk is low, 
fees will be lower when there are females on the audit committee than for all-male audit 
committees. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: Female presence on the audit committee will strengthen the positive relationship 
between inherent risk factors and audit fees. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The initial sample includes all companies with audit committees listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange in the year 2011. The year 2011 has a special significance since it was the 
first year companies were expected to report the diversity of their boards of directors including 
female representation on the board and subcommittees (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2010). After excluding companies from the financial sector and companies with missing 
15 
 
information, the final sample comprises 624 companies. The data used in the study come 
primarily from notes in the annual reports while other information is obtained from Thomson 
Reuter’s BoardRoom, SandP’s Capital IQ and Morningstar’s FinAnalysis databases. 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
Consistent with prior studies, the dependent variable, audit fees, is measured as the 
natural log of fees paid to auditors (Carcello et al. 2002; Loukil, 2014).  We use the variable 
AUD_FEES to designate audit fees. The independent variable female representation on the 
audit committee, represented by FEM_CODE, is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether 
females are present on the audit committee or not (Abbott et al., 2012; Ittonen et al., 2010). In 
line with previous studies, variables for characteristics related to audit committee effectiveness 
are included.  These are independence, experience and education (Abbott et al., 2003; Ittonen 
et al., 2010; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007). Audit committee independence, AC_INDP, is 
measured as the proportion of audit committee members that are independent and 
nonexecutive. Audit committee experience, AC_EXP, is operationalized as the proportion of 
audit committee members that have board experience. Audit committee education, AC_EDU, 
is measured as the proportion of audit committee members with an accounting or finance 
degree or who have an accounting-related professional certification (e.g., CPA, CMA or CFA). 
We also include variables representing the firm’s situational audit risk factors: firm 
size, firm risk, and audit complexity (Carcello et al., 2002; Kane and Velury, 2004; Lee and 
Mande, 2005; Loukil, 2014; Simunic, 1980). Firm size, SIZE, is measured as the natural log of 
total assets. Leverage, LEV, is the proxy for firm risk which is measured as total debt divided 
by total assets. Complexity, INVREC, is measured as total inventory and receivables divided 
by total assets. 
Finally, we control for four additional firm specific characteristics: the type of auditor, 
firm performance, liquidity and industry. The variable BIG4 is used to proxy the type of auditor. 
16 
 
It equals one if the auditor is a Big Four accounting firm and zero otherwise. Performance, 
ROA, is measured as the return on assets which is earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets. Liquidity, CR, is represented by the current ratio which is measured as total current 
assets divided by total current liabilities. Industry is controlled for by using industry fixed 
effects. This is conducted by the use of K - 1 industry dummy variables. 
3.3 Method 
The study uses univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses to test the hypotheses 
presented in the previous section. Univariate analysis is carried out through ANOVA to test 
whether the means of the variables are different for companies that have female representation 
on the audit committee relative to those that do not. Additionally, we conduct ANOVA on all 
variables to determine whether differences exist based on the presence of firm size, risk, and 
audit complexity. Bivariate analysis is carried out in the form of Pearson’s correlation analysis. 
Multivariate analysis is conducted via the estimation of the following OLS regression model: 
i
iiii
iiiii
effectsfixedIndustryCRROABIGINVRECLEV
SIZEAC_EDUβAC_EXPβAC_INDPβFEM_CODEββ=AUD_FEES
ε
βββββ
β
+
++++++
+++++
109876
543210
4  
(1) 
 where 
AUD_FEESi = Natural log of audit fees for firm i. 
FEM_CODEi = One if at least one audit committee member is female and zero otherwise 
for firm i. 
AC_INDPi  = Proportion of audit committee members that are independent and 
nonexecutive for firm i. 
AC_EXPi = Proportion of audit committee members that have board experience for 
firm i. 
AC_EDUi = Proportion of audit committee members with a finance or accounting 
degree (or have CPA, CMA or CFA) for firm i. 
SIZEi = Natural log of total assets for firm i. 
LEVi  = Total debt to total assets for firm i. 
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INVRECi  = Inventory and receivables divided by total assets for firm i. 
BIG4i  = One if the auditor for firm i is a Big Four auditor and zero otherwise. 
ROAi  = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i. 
CRi   = Total current assets divided by total current liabilities for firm i. 
Industry fixed  
effects   = K - 1 industry dummy variables. 
 
In line with prior studies, we expect that factors such as firm size, firm risk, and audit 
complexity play an important role in determining audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002; Kane and 
Velury, 2004; Lee and Mande, 2005; Loukil, 2014; Simunic, 1980). Two methods are used to 
examine the impact of these factors.  
The first method is to split the sample into three pairs of subsets based on the median 
values of the three inherent risk factors mentioned above. The sample is split into small and 
large sized companies; low and high risk companies; and low and high complexity audits. The 
model is then estimated for each subset separately and the results are examined to identify 
differences in the subset pairs.  
The second method is to introduce interaction terms to the model. The first interaction 
term, SIZE_INTR, is FEM_CODE multiplied by SIZE. This interaction term is used only when 
testing the impact of female committee representation in the presence of company size. The 
second interaction term, RISK_INTR, is FEM_CODE multiplied by RISK. This interaction term 
is used only when testing the impact of female committee representation in the presence of 
company risk. The third interaction term, INVREC_INTR, is FEM_CODE multiplied by 
INVREC. This interaction term is used only when testing the impact of female committee 
representation in the presence of complexity. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
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The descriptive statistics for all the companies in the sample are reported in Panel A, 
Table 1. The mean for audit fees is 5.031 and the standard deviation is 0.514. Approximately 
fifteen percent (15.4%) of the companies have at least one female member on the audit 
committee. These results indicate that female representation is fairly modest and that the vast 
majority of companies do not have female board members on the audit committee. Reported 
next are the variables representative of characteristics related to the effectiveness of the audit 
committee. The mean proportion of independent audit committee members is 58.6%; the mean 
proportion of members with board experience is 47.0%; however, the mean proportion of 
members with accounting educational credentials is only 25.9%. These percentages indicate 
that the composition of audit committees varies across the three effectiveness proxies. The 
mean natural log of total assets, which represents company size, is 7.816. The risk variable 
suggests that, on average, 40% of assets are financed through debt. On average, receivables 
and inventory represent 18% of total assets and almost 50% of all companies have a Big Four 
auditor. Average performance, measured by return on assets, is -29.2%. Finally, the mean for 
the liquidity variable shows that current assets are more than six times greater than current 
liabilities. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Panel B, Table 1, shows the descriptive statistics for companies that have females on 
the audit committee (n = 96). The overall results suggest that these companies have certain 
characteristics that distinguish them from other companies. The mean for audit fees is 5.439 
and the standard deviation is 0.615. The mean proportion of independent audit committee 
members for these companies is 61.8%, while the mean proportion of members with board 
experience is 52.4%. The mean proportion of members with accounting educational credentials 
is 24.1%. The mean for company size, risk, complexity, having a Big Four auditor, profitability 
and liquidity are 8.150, 0.352, 0.291, 0.720, -0.0006, and 4.947 respectively.  However, the 
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statistical significance in these differences requires the use of ANOVA analysis. 
Recall that 96 (15.4%) companies from our sample of 624 have female audit committee 
representation. Table 2 provides more detailed information.  When gender diversity is present 
on the audit committee, the number of female audit committee members ranges from one to 
four.  While only one company (1%) in the sample has four female audit committee members, 
two companies (2%) have three females, thirteen (14%) have two females, and the 
overwhelming majority (80 companies or 83%) have only one female member.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Table 2 also provides a breakdown of female representation based on situational factors. 
The majority of females represented on the audit committee are found in large, high risk, and 
high complex companies. In terms of company size, 22% of large size companies have females 
on the audit committee as opposed to only 9% for small size companies. For risk, these 
percentages are 19% and 12% respectively. As for complexity, companies with females on the 
audit committee represent 17% and 14% of high and low complexity companies respectively. 
The largest number of companies with females on the audit committee is found in the 
Materials industry (n = 20). However, since the Materials industry is the largest amongst all 
other industries, the percentage of female representation in this industry relative to other 
industries is in fact the lowest (9%). On the other hand, seven out of 18 companies in the 
Utilities industry have females on the audit committee, thus making it the industry with most 
female presentation (39%). 
4.2 ANOVA Results 
ANOVA is used to assess variations in the means for the variables based on the 
presence or absence of female members on audit committees. However, there is an issue of 
unequal sample sizes as the number of audit committees that have female members is much 
fewer than the number of audit committees that do not. As a result, we use Brown-Forsythe 
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ANOVA to address this concern. The results reported in Table 3 suggest that there is a 
significant difference in the means for AUD_FEES across the two subsets (p < .01). This 
indicates that audit fees are higher for companies that have female representation on the audit 
committee relative to other companies. ANOVA results also show that the means for SIZE, 
BIG4, and ROA are significantly different for companies that have female audit committee 
members versus committees that do not (p < .01). This shows that firms with females on the 
audit committee tend to be larger, to have a Big Four auditor, and to be more profitable than 
firms with all-male audit committees. Additionally, the results in Table 3 show that there is a 
significant difference in the means for CR (p < .05). This indicates that firms with females on 
the audit committee tend to be more liquid than companies without female audit committee 
members. 
(Table 3 about here) 
 ANOVA is also conducted to assess differences in variable means in the presence of 
company size, company risk and audit complexity as shown in Table 4. Sample sizes are equal 
in this analysis as the total sample is split at the median. The results demonstrate that there are 
significant differences in means for AUD_FEES, FEM_CODE, AC_INDP, BIG4, ROA, and 
CR (p < .01) based on firm size. Audit fees are significantly higher for larger companies. 
Furthermore, larger companies are more likely to have female audit committee members, 
independent audit committee members, a Big Four auditor, higher profitability and less 
liquidity. Table 4 also presents ANOVA results for company risk. The results indicate that 
significant differences exist for means of AUD_FEES, AC_INDP, SIZE, INVREC, BIG4 and 
CR (p < .01) as well as FEM_CODE and AC_EDU (p < .05). These findings suggest that higher 
audit fees are paid by companies that have greater risk relative to other companies. 
Furthermore, female presence on the audit committee, higher levels of independence and 
education on the audit committee, larger size, higher audit complexity, having a Big Four 
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auditor and less liquidity are found in riskier companies relative to other companies. 
(Table 4 about here) 
A similar ANOVA is conducted to assess the differences in the variable means in the 
presence of audit complexity. The ANOVA results for the means of high versus low complexity 
firms are presented in Table 4. These results indicate that the means for AUD_FEES, SIZE, 
LEV, BIG4 and CR are significantly different based on the complexity of the audit as measured 
by INVREC (p < .01). This suggests that audit fees are higher for more complex audits relative 
to other audits. Furthermore, firms with more complexity are larger, have higher risk, and tend 
to retain a Big Four auditor. However, the mean liquidity is much lower for high complexity 
firms versus low complexity firms. 
4.3 Correlation Analysis Results 
The correlation results are reported in Table 5. The presence of females on the audit committee 
is positively correlated with firm size (p < .01), complexity (p < .05), and having a Big Four 
auditor (p < .01). There is a negative correlation between audit committee independence and 
expertise on the audit committee (p < .01). However, expertise on the audit committee and 
accounting education of audit committee members are positively correlated (p < .01). Company 
size is negatively correlated to risk (p < .01) and liquidity (p < .01), while it is positively 
correlated to having a Big Four auditor (p < .01) and profitability (p < .01). Risk is negatively 
correlated to profitability (p < .01), and liquidity (p < .01). Although the correlation coefficients 
are relatively small, thus dismissing concerns for multicollinearity, collinearity diagnostics in 
the form of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) is undertaken before conducting the regression 
analysis. 
(Table 5 about here) 
4.4 Regression Results 
OLS regression is used to examine the impact of female representation on the audit 
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committee on the amount of audit fees paid. The VIF results indicate that there is no 
multicollinearity in the data. Results of the regression analysis are presented in Models 1 
through 4 in Table 6.  Model 1 shows the regression results without the industry fixed effects 
while Model 2 includes the eight industry variables. Models 3 and 4 replace the variable 
FEM_CODE with FEM_NUM (number of females on the audit committee) as a robustness test 
to the main variable. However, Model 3 excludes the industry variables while Model 4 includes 
them. 
The results in Model 1 explain approximately 69% of the variance in audit fees. As 
expected, the analysis shows that the presence of a female on the audit committee is associated 
with higher audit fees (p < .01). This is consistent with prior studies that adopt a demand-side 
perspective to the relationship between audit fees and audit committee characteristics (Abbott 
et al., 2003; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Zaman et al, 2011). 
However, our findings are in conflict with Ittonen et al. (2010) who find a negative relationship 
between audit fees and females on the audit committee. The three other variables related to 
audit committee effectiveness did not demonstrate significant relationships at the .05 level. 
However, company size (SIZE), company risk (LEV), audit complexity (INVREC) and 
engaging a Big Four auditor (BIG4) are positively related to audit fees (p < .01). Liquidity (CR) 
is the only significant control variable that is negatively related to audit fees (p < .01). The 
results in Model 2, which include industry fixed effects, echo the results reported in Model 1. 
Although the explanatory power of the model increased to almost 72%, the statistical 
significance for the coefficient of audit independence (AC_INDP) and complexity (INVREC) 
dropped drastically.  It is important to note that, all other things being equal, AUD_FEES are 
lower for firms in the energy and materials sectors than in the reference industry sector (p < 
.01). The results reported under Models 3 and 4 mirror those reported under Models 1 and 2. 
This suggests that there is no difference between the two proxies for female representatives on 
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the audit committee. As a result, the remaining analysis is conducted with the original variable, 
FEM_CODE. 
(Table 6 about here) 
The relationship between audit fees and female representation is also examined by 
modeling the interaction of female audit committee participation with company size, risk, and 
audit complexity. Table 7 presents the results of investigating the interplay of female presence 
on the audit committee and firm size. The first approach is to split the sample into small SIZE 
and large SIZE subsets based on the value being below and above the median of SIZE. The 
results show that there is no relationship between female representation on the audit committee 
and audit fees for small firms. Additionally, none of the other audit committee effectiveness 
variables have a significant relationship with audit fees for small firms. However, company 
risk, engaging a Big Four auditor and profitability are positively related to audit fees (p < .01). 
For large firms, female representation on the audit committee is positively related to audit fees 
(p < .01). However, the only two other control variables that are related to audit fees at a 
significance level of .05 or less are firm risk and use of a Big Four auditor. The adjusted R2 
values of 0.326 and 0.435 for the small and large company samples respectively indicate the 
model does not explain much of the variance when applied to the subsamples. This is not 
unexpected as the most important predictor, SIZE, is not included in the model for this analysis. 
(Table 7 about here) 
The second approach is to assess the relationship between audit fees and female 
representation on the audit committee using interaction terms. It is clear from Table 7 that the 
model accounts for over 72% of the variance when applied to the entire sample and an 
interaction term calculated as the product of SIZE and FEM_CODE is included in the model. 
The interaction term is positive and significant (p < .01) indicating that female presence on the 
audit committee strengthens the positive relationship between firm size and audit fees. To 
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better understand this interaction, Figure 2 presents a visualization of the relationship by 
plotting the interaction using points one standard deviation above and below the mean. The 
figure demonstrates that in smaller firms, fees are lower when there are women on the audit 
committee but in large firms the opposite occurs. 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
The same procedures are used to examine how female audit committee membership 
interacts with risk. As shown in Table 8 for both low and high LEV firms, female participation 
on the audit committee is significantly related to audit fees (p < .05). For the low LEV 
subsample, audit committee education is the only audit committee characteristic that is 
significantly related to audit fees (p < .10), and it is negative. However, none of the audit 
committee effectiveness variables are related to audit fees for the high LEV subsample. In terms 
of firm characteristics, size, use of a Big Four auditor, and profitability are significant 
predictors for both subsamples (p < .01). However, complexity is only a significant factor for 
high LEV firms (p < .01).  
(Table 8 about here) 
Table 8 further indicates that the model accounts for over 72% of the variance when 
the entire sample is examined using an interaction term calculated as the product of LEV and 
FEM_Code. The interaction term is positive and significant (p < .05) which suggests that the 
presence of females on the audit committee strengthens the positive relationship between 
company risk and audit fees. Examination of the interaction plot (see Figure 3) shows that when 
risk is low, female presence on the audit committee results in lower fees; however, when risk 
is high and females are present on the committee, fees are higher. 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
Finally, Table 9 presents the results of the regression model in the presence of 
complexity. For low INVREC firms, audit fees is positively related to female presence on the 
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audit committee (p < .05). Audit committee independence, firm size, firm risk, and having a 
Big Four auditor are also significantly related to audit fees (p < .01), while profitability is 
negatively related at the .05 significance level. The adjusted R2 for the low INVREC subsample 
is 0.660. Results of the regression on the high INVREC subsample indicate that the presence of 
females on the committee is again positive and significantly related to audit fees (p < .10). 
However, while firm size, risk, and engaging a Big Four audit firm are significant predictors 
(p < .01), audit committee independence is not. The adjusted R2 for the high INVREC 
subsample is 0.768. 
(Table 9 about here) 
 Table 9 reports the results of regression analysis on the full sample using an interaction 
term in the model that is the product of INVREC and FEM_CODE. This results in an adjusted 
R2 of .729 and demonstrates that the interaction term is significant and negatively related to 
audit fees (p < .01). This suggests that female representation on the audit committee dampens 
the positive relationship between audit complexity and audit fees. Examination of the 
interaction plot (see Figure 4) shows almost no change in audit fees between low and high 
complexity when there are no females on the audit committee. However, when females are on 
the committee, fees are higher in low complexity situations than they are in high complexity 
situations. 
<Figure 4 about here> 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of the study provide solid support for the importance of gender diversity on 
the audit committee. The examination of female representation on the audit committee and 
audit fees shows a positive relationship which supports the demand-side argument for audit 
effort. This is to say that audit committees with female members require more services from 
the external auditor, thus incurring higher audit fees. However, the interaction of female 
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presence on the committee with factors that create audit risk provides critical findings that 
explain gender diversity and audit fees. In the presence of low size and low risk, we find support 
for the supply-side argument in that fees are lower when there are women on the audit 
committee. This supports our proposition that the impact of females on the monitoring process 
sufficiently reduces risk to outweigh demands for increased audit effort. On the other hand, in 
the presence of high size and high risk, we find support for the demand-side argument in that 
fees are higher when women are on the audit committee. In these situations, the necessity of 
additional effort demanded by the circumstances outweighs the improved monitoring effected 
by women on the audit committee. 
However, in examining audit complexity, we find the opposite. In situations where 
there is audit complexity, female representation dampens the positive relationship between 
complexity and audit fees. Consistent with the demand-side argument, in low complexity 
situations audit fees are higher when there are women on the audit committee than when there 
are none. However, in the presence of high audit complexity, audit fees are lower when a 
female member is on the audit committee than when there are no females. This negative 
interaction is an intriguing difference from the interaction effects found for size and risk. We 
suggest that this may demonstrate the female demand for more external audit effort in the low 
complexity situation and that high complexity is better managed by increased monitoring 
activity than are size and risk; however, we recognize that further research is required to unravel 
this perplexity. 
We acknowledge that our findings and implications for the present study are subject to 
several limitations and these provide opportunities for further research.  Firstly, our sample 
comprises ASX firms; thus, our empirical analysis is limited to publicly-traded Australian 
firms. Our findings are not necessarily generalizable to firms outside of Australia.  Secondly, 
our study was confined to the year 2011 which was selected because it was the first year 
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corporate governance regulations required ASX companies to report on their diversity policies 
(ASX Corporate governance Council, 2010). Studying a later period may yield different results.  
Given that early adopters of board and subcommittee diversity policies may have been 
motivated to do so by reasons other than consideration of females’ expertise and qualities, an 
extended research period may be useful.  This would determine how female representation on 
the audit committee affects audit fees over time and perhaps also determine whether 
appointments are merit-based or are largely tokenism based on adhering to corporate 
governance regulations.  Thirdly, our factors for audit risk followed Simunic (1980) and were 
based on three elements of inherent risk: firm size, firm risk, and audit complexity.  Alternate 
proxies for their measurement are possible and may yield different results.  
Despite these limitations, this study makes several important contributions. Firstly, it 
provides a counterpoint to the Ittonen et al. (2010) study by demonstrating contradictory 
results. This establishes the need for more intensive study to better understand how such 
divergent findings are possible. Secondly, this study proposes a conceptual model that 
integrates the two opposing approaches of explaining audit committee effectiveness on audit 
fees and has used this model to explain the impact of female representation on the audit 
committee. By incorporating both supply-side and demand-side approaches, we provide a 
parsimonious yet inclusive framework for future research into these contradictory findings. 
Thirdly, we provide empirical evidence to support the proposition that female representation is 
a significant factor in impacting audit fees but that the impact is different depending on 
situational factors inherent to the firm and the audit. Each of these contributions has important 
ramifications not only for the academic understanding of this phenomenon but also for 
practitioners and policymakers. Given the differential impact of women in governance roles, 
there may be situations which do not benefit from their influence. However, there may be 
situations in which female presence is not only important but crucial to effective governance.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
                      Panel A: All Companies   
       
AUD_FEES 624 5.031 4.941 0.514 2.732 7.158 
FEM_CODE 624 0.154 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
AC_INDP   624 0.586 0.667 0.392 0.000 1.000 
AC_EXP  624 0.470 0.500 0.351 0.000 1.000 
AC_EDU   624 0.259 0.250 0.282 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 624 7.816 7.722 0.974 4.263 11.071 
LEV 624 0.400 0.267 0.906 0.007 10.000 
INVREC 624 0.179 0.086 0.489 0.000 11.462 
BIG4 624 0.494 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
ROA 624 -0.292 -0.030 1.899 -35.718 0.969 
CR 624 6.689 2.215 13.968 0.000  226.060 
                                                  Panel B: Female Representation on Audit Committees 
       
AUD_FEES 96 5.439 5.412 0.615 4.228 7.158 
AC_INDP   96 0.618 0.667 0.387 0.000 1.000 
AC_EXP  96 0.524 0.500 0.323 0.000 1.000 
AC_EDU   96 0.241 0.200 0.273 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 96 8.510 8.526 1.077 6.065 11.071 
LEV 96 0.352 0.368 0.228 0.009 0.899 
INVREC 96 0.291 0.102 1.166 0.000 11.462 
BIG4 96 0.720 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
ROA 96 -0.006 0.054 0.222 -1.196 0.578 
CR 96 4.947 1.790 7.842 0.160 49.140 
 
Notes: AUD_FEES = Natural log of audit fees, FEM_CODE = 1 if one audit committee member is female and 
zero otherwise, AC_INDP = Proportion of audit committee members that are independent and nonexecutive, 
AC_EXP = Proportion of audit committee members that have board experience, AC_EDU = Proportion of audit 
committee members with a finance or accounting degree (or have CPA, CMA or CFA), SIZE = Natural log of total 
assets,  LEV = Total debt to total assets, INVREC = Total inventory and receivables divided by total assets, BIG4 
= One if the auditor is a Big Four and zero otherwise, ROA = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets, CR = Total current assets divided by total current liabilities. 
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Table 2: Demographics of Audit Committees with Female Members 
 
  
Female 
Members 
Number of 
Firms % of Females  
Committee Composition One Female 80 96 83% 
 Two Females 13 96 14% 
 Three Females 2 96 2% 
 Four Females 1 96 1% 
Situational Factors Large Size 69 312 22% 
 Small Size 27 312 9% 
 High Risk 59 312 19% 
 Low Risk 37 312 12% 
 High Complexity 53 312 17% 
 Low Complexity 43 312 14% 
Industry Energy 11 92 12% 
 Materials 20 224 9% 
 Industrial 14 97 14% 
 Consumer Discretionary 19 71 27% 
 Consumer Staples 5 16 31% 
 Health Care 13 52 25% 
 Information Technology 4 40 10% 
 Telecom 3 14 21% 
 Utilities 7 18 39% 
 
  
Table 3: Brown-Forsythe ANOVA for Variables in the Presence of Female Audit 
Committee Members 
 
FEM_CODE 
Variable Factor Mean Std. Deviation 
  ANOVA 
  F 
        
 No female 4.957 0.456   
AUD_FEES Female 5.439 0.615  53.457*** 
  All 5.031 0.514     
 No female 0.581 0.394   
AC_INDP   Female 0.618 0.387  0.765 
  All 0.586 0.392     
 No female 0.460 0.355   
AC_EXP Female 0.524 0.323  3.151 
  All 0.470 0.351     
 No female 0.263 0.284   
AC_EDU   Female 0.241 0.273  0.496 
  All 0.259 0.282     
 No female 7.689 0.899   
SIZE  Female 8.510 1.077   49.485***  
 All 7.816 0.974   
 No female 0.409 0.980   
LEV Female 0.352 0.228  1.358 
  All 0.400 0.906     
 No female 0.158 0.188   
INVREC Female 0.291 1.166  1.238 
  All 0.179 0.489     
 No female 0.453 0.498   
BIG4 Female 0.719 0.452  27.255*** 
  All 0.494 0.500     
 No female -0.344 2.059   
ROA Female -0.006 0.222  13.338*** 
  All -0.292 1.899     
 No female 7.006 14.795   
CR Female 4.947 7.842  4.019** 
  All 6.689 13.968     
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.    
This table presents Brown-Forsythe ANOVA due to the unequal groups of female and non-female audit committee 
members (96 with females and 528 with no females). Additionally, this test is used due to the lack of homogeneity 
of variances between the groups of female and non-female audit committee members. Refer to Table 1 for 
definitions of variables. 
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Table 4: ANOVA for Variables for different sized companies, level of risk and complexity   
Firm Size  Risk  INVREC 
Variable Factor Mean Std. Deviation 
 ANOVA  Variable Factor Mean Std. Deviation 
  ANOVA  Variable Factor Mean Std. Deviation 
 ANOVA 
  F    F    F 
 Small 4.712 0.297    
 Low  4.802 0.378    
 Low  4.857 0.460   
AUD_FEES Large 5.350 0.486  392.02***  AUD_FEES High 5.260 0.530  154.73***  AUD_FEES High  5.205 0.507  80.280*** 
  All 5.031 0.514        All 5.031 0.514        All 5.031 0.514     
 Small 0.087 0.282     Low  0.119 0.324    
 Low  0.138 0.345   
FEM_CODE Large 0.221 0.416  22.427***  FEM_CODE High 0.189 0.392 
 5.996**  FEM_CODE High 0.170 0.376 
 1.230 
  All 0.154 0.361        All 0.154 0.361        All 0.154 0.361     
 Small 0.515 0.398     Low  0.540 0.396    
 Low  0.576 0.397   
AC_INDP   Large 0.658 0.374  21.547***  AC_INDP   High 0.633 0.384 
 8.880***  AC_INDP   High 0.596 0.388 
 0.412 
  All 0.586 0.392        All 0.586 0.392        All 0.586 0.392     
 Small 0.451 0.359     Low  0.463 0.357    
 Low  0.485 0.337   
AC_EXP Large 0.489 0.342  1.862  AC_EXP High 0.477 0.344  0.269  AC_EXP High  0.455 0.364  1.127 
  All 0.470 0.351        All 0.470 0.351        All 0.470 0.351     
 Small 0.248 0.294     Low  0.227 0.265    
 Low  0.248 0.286   
AC_EDU   Large 0.270 0.270  0.952  AC_EDU   High 0.291 0.295  8.022**  AC_EDU   High 0.27 0.278 
 0.986 
  All 0.259 0.282        All 0.259 0.282        All 0.259 0.282     
        Low  7.499 0.736    
 Low  7.702 0.952   
SIZE       SIZE High 8.132 1.076  73.489***  SIZE High 7.929 0.984 
 8.630*** 
               All 7.816 0.974        All 7.816 0.974     
 Small 0.423 1.260           
 Low  0.284 0.805   
LEV Large 0.377 0.240  0.408  LEV       LEV High 0.516 0.985 
 10.411*** 
  All 0.400 0.906                     All 0.400 0.906     
 Small 0.184 0.672     Low  0.120 0.657    
      
INVREC Large 0.173 0.168  0.084  INVREC High 0.237 0.202  9.020***  INVREC 
     
  All 0.179 0.489        All 0.179 0.489                  
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Notes:    
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.    
This table presents ANOVA for the variables under three different situational factors. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of variables. 
 
 Small 0.260 0.439     Low  0.410 0.493    
 Low  0.423 0.495   
BIG4 Large 0.728 0.446  174.48***  BIG4 High 0.570 0.495  16.398***  BIG4 High 0.564 0.497 
 12.624*** 
  All 0.494 0.500        All 0.490 0.500        All 0.494 0.500     
 Small -0.622 2.644 
    Low  -0.242 0.761   
 
 Low  -0.260 0.838 
  
ROA Large 0.038 0.138  19.386*** 
 
ROA High -0.341 2.577  0.424 
 
ROA High  -0.324 2.554 
 0.175 
  All -0.292 1.899      
  All -0.292 1.899     
 
  All -0.292 1.899     
 Small 8.292 12.026     Low  11.781 18.36    
 Low  10.17 18.370   
CR Large 5.086 15.525  8.315***  CR High 1.597 1.311 
 95.514***  CR High  3.208 5.389 
 41.265*** 
  All 6.689 13.968        All 6.689 13.968        All 6.689 13.968     
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Table 5: Correlation Analysis  
 
 FEM_CODE AC_INDP AC_EXP AC_EDU SIZE LEV INVREC BIG4 ROA CR 
FEM_CODE 1.000          
AC_INDP   0.035 1.000         
AC_EXP  0.066 -0.176*** 1.000        
AC_EDU   -0.027 -0.032 0.386*** 1.000       
SIZE 0.304*** 0.216*** 0.045 0.036 1.000      
LEV -0.023 -0.017 0.056 0.036 -0.147*** 1.000     
INVREC 0.098** 0.037 0.010 0.075 -0.023 0.043 1.000    
BIG4 0.192*** 0.157*** 0.027 -0.038 0.516*** -0.008 -0.016 1.000   
ROA 0.064 0.030 -0.030 0.022 0.335*** -0.603*** -0.024 0.105*** 1.000  
CR -0.053 -0.021 -0.030 -0.102** -0.124*** -0.155*** 0.005 -0.098** 0.010 1.000 
 
Notes:  ***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 6: The Relationship between Audit Fees and Female Directors on the Audit 
Committee  
 
 Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
FEM_CODE 0.094*** 0.074***   
 (3.968) (3.215)   
FEM_NUM   0.087*** 0.063*** 
   (3.696) (2.761) 
AC_INDP 0.043* 0.035 0.044* 0.035 
 (1.862) (1.550) (1.873) (1.551) 
AC_EXP 0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.018) -(0.547) -(0.034) -(0.561) 
AC_EDU   -0.023 -0.017 -0.025 -0.018 
 -(0.946) -(0.704) -(1.034) -(0.777) 
SIZE 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.615*** 0.627*** 
 (20.987) (21.792) (21.401) (22.202) 
LEV 0.162*** 0.127*** 0.162*** 0.127*** 
 (5.683) (4.534) (5.680) (4.539) 
INVREC  0.070*** 0.039* 0.072*** 0.041* 
 (3.095) (1.756) (3.193) (1.854) 
BIG4   0.254*** 0.236*** 0.252*** 0.235*** 
 (9.687) (9.288) (9.583) (9.224) 
ROA   0.006 -0.014 0.005 -0.014 
 (0.204) -(0.484) (0.186) -(0.501) 
CR -0.089*** -0.048** -0.088*** -0.048** 
 (-3.864) -(2.130) (-3.865) -(2.133) 
Energy  -0.176***  -0.174*** 
  -(3.212)  -(3.177) 
Materials  -0.268***  -0.267*** 
  -(3.747)  -(3.726) 
Industrial  -0.091*  -0.094* 
  -(1.651)  -(1.690) 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.068  -0.066 
  -(1.370)  -(1.338) 
Consumer Staples  -0.028  -0.027 
  -(0.919)  -(0.888) 
Health care  -0.032  -0.032 
  -(0.713)  -(0.698) 
Information Tech    -0.18  -0.017 
  -(0.446)  -(0.419) 
Utilities  0.048  -0.047 
  -(1.504)  -(1.449) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.692 0.719 0.691 0.717 
N 624 624 624 624 
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.    
Model 1 presents regression results for the relationship between audit fees and female directors on the audit 
committee. Model 2 includes industry fixed effects. The t-values are given in parenthesis below each estimate. 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) does not suggest multicollinearity. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 7: The Relationship between Audit Fees and Female Directors on the Audit 
Committee for Different-Sized Companies 
 
    Size 
Variables   Small       Large   Interaction   
           
FEM_CODE  0.056  0.228***  -0.699***  
  (1.160)  (5.048)  -(3.925)  
SIZE      0.566***  
      (18.458)  
SIZE_INTR      0.797***  
      (4.374)  
AC_INDP  0.043  0.079*  0.028   
  (0.885)  (1.731)  (1.278)  
AC_EXP  -0.046  0.054  -0.009  
  -(0.894)  (1.095)  -(0.370)  
AC_EDU  -0.019  -0.020  -0.021  
  -(0.371)  -(0.411)  -(0.906)  
LEV  0.176***  0.227***  0.120***  
  (2.800)  (4.460)  (4.363)  
INVREC  0.076  0.094*  0.052**  
  (1.484)  (1.810)  (2.335)  
BIG4  0.337***  0.409***  0.238***  
  (6.937)  (9.097)  (9.539)  
ROA  0.190***  0.063  -0.002  
  (3.104)  (1.400)  -(0.062)  
CR  -0.059  -0.051  -0.046**  
  -(1.159)  -(1.112)  -(2.065)  
Energy  -0.270**  -0.151  -0.144***   
  -(2.214)  -(1.355)  -(2.642)  
Materials  -0.378**  -0.297**  -0.224***  
  -(2.334)  -(2.127)  (-3.153)  
Industrial  -0.069  -0.233*  -0.055  
  -(0.682)  -(1.838)  -(0.998)  
Consumer Discretionary  0.043  -0.203*  -0.038  
  (0.437)  -(1.855)  -(0.775)  
Consumer Staples  -0.086  -0.087  -0.025  
  -(1.547)  -(1.203)  -(0.825)  
Health care  0.001  -0.129  -0.006  
  (0.011)  -(1.620)  -(0.128)  
Information Tech    0.009  -0.117*  0.001  
  (0.084)  -(1.707)  (0.035)  
Utilities  -0.134**  -0.048  -0.046  
  -(1.976)  -(0.707)  -(1.465)  
        
N  312  312  624  
Adj. R2   0.326   0.435   0.727   
 
Notes:  
***, **, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
The t-values are given in parenthesis below each estimate. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of variables.  
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Table 8: The Relationship between Audit Fees and Female Directors on the Audit 
Committee in the presence of Company Risk 
 
    Risk 
Variables   Low Risk   High Risk   Interaction   
           
FEM_CODE  0.076**  0.072**  -0.001   
  (1.993)  (2.026)  -(0.012)  
LEV      0.122***  
      (4.364)  
LEV_INTR      0.098**  
      (2.426)  
AC_INDP  0.034  0.017  0.034  
  (0.898)  (0.515)  (1.535)  
AC_EXP  -0.015  0.005  -0.012  
  -(0.372)  (0.135)  -(0.499)  
AC_EDU  -0.067*  -0.010  -0.020  
  -(1.711)  -(0.272)  -(0.863)  
SIZE  0.548***  0.646***  0.606***  
  (12.762)  (13.903)  (20.932)  
INVREC  0.053  0.107***  0.048**  
  (1.295)  (3.040)  (2.113)  
BIG4  0.280***  0.282***  0.237***  
  (6.825)  (7.232)  (9.379)  
ROA  -0.108***  -0.094***  -0.013  
  -(2.639)  -(2.699)  -(0.447)  
CR  -0.059  -0.011  -0.045**  
  -(1.575)  -(0.352)  -(2.014)  
Energy  0.513*  -0.118**  -0.163***   
  (1.948)  -(2.131)  -(2.972)  
Materials  0.602*  -0.230***  -0.253***  
  (1.838)  -(3.285)  (-3.542)  
Industrial  0.310**  -0.142*  -0.085  
  (2.046)  -(1.945)  -(1.534)  
Consumer Discretionary  0.418***  -0.124*  -0.064  
  (2.675)  -(1.904)  -(1.286)  
Consumer Staples  0.137*  -0.055  -0.029  
  (1.869)  -(1.262)  -(0.938)  
Health care  0.515***  -0.066  -0.026  
  (2.708)  -(1.268)  -(0.588)  
Information Tech    0.421***  -0.028  -0.012  
  (2.689)  -(0.548)  -(0.290)  
Utilities  0.160  -0.026  -0.056*  
         (1.623)       -(0.585)       -(1.740)  
        
N  312  312  624  
Adj. R2   0.587   0.701   0.721   
 
Notes:  
***, **, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
The t-values are given in parenthesis below each estimate. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of variables.  
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Table 9: The Relationship between Audit Fees and Female Directors on the Audit 
Committee in the presence of Audit Complexity 
 
    Complexity 
Variables   Low INVREC   High INVREC   Interaction   
           
FEM_CODE  0.086**  0.057*  0.122***  
  (2.436)  (1.821)  (4.967)  
INVREC      0.357***  
      (5.220)  
INVREC_INTR      -0.340***  
      -(4.905)  
AC_INDP  0.121***  -0.013  0.033  
  (3.381)  -(0.463)  (1.489)  
AC_EXP  0.015  -0.032  -0.005  
  (0.410)  -(0.977)  -(0.235)  
AC_EDU  -0.053  0.015  -0.014  
  -(1.480)  (0.467)  -(0.622)  
SIZE  0.553***  0.769***  0.627***  
  (12.583)  (18.710)  (22.414)  
LEV  0.114***  0.181***  0.126***  
  (3.244)  (3.808)  (4.582)  
BIG4  0.254***  0.196***  0.234***  
  (6.639)  (5.786)  (9.386)  
ROA  -0.081**  0.008  -0.007  
  -(2.200)  (0.169)  -(0.232)  
CR  -0.034  -0.031  -0.034  
  -(0.992)  -(0.991)  -(1.509)  
Energy  -0.192  -0.069  -0.144***   
  -(1.101)  -(1.455)  -(2.667)  
Materials  -0.308  -0.129**  -0.223***  
  -(1.468)  -(2.032)  -(3.149)  
Industrial  -0.107  -0.072  -0.099*  
  -(1.096)  -(1.079)  -(1.820)  
Consumer Discretionary  -0.047  -0.053  -0.075  
  -(0.436)  -(0.910)  -(1.531)  
Consumer Staples  0.001  -0.051  -0.032  
  (0.025)  -(1.247)  -(1.046)  
Health care  -0.054  0.014  -0.020  
  -(0.483)  (0.274)  -(0.457)  
Information Tech    -0.054  0.026  -0.016  
  -(0.730)  (0.517)  -(0.393)  
Utilities  -0.002  -0.030  -0.027   
     -(0.025)  -(0.954)  -(0.837)  
        
N  312  312  624  
Adj. R2   0.660   0.768   0.729   
 
Notes:  
***, **, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
The t-values are given in parenthesis below each estimate. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of variables.  
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Figure 1. Unified Model of Supply-side and Demand-side Theories of Audit Committee 
Effectiveness 
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Figure 2. Interaction Effect of Female Representation on the Audit Committee with Firm 
Size in Determining Audit Fees 
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Figure 3. Interaction Effect of Female Representation on the Audit Committee with Audit 
Risk in Determining Audit Fees 
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Figure 4. Interaction Effect of Female Representation on the Audit Committee with 
Complexity in Determining Audit Fees 
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